Vertical SaaS Roll-Up Examples: 7 Buy-and-Build Compounders, Explained

Vertical SaaS Roll-Up Examples: 7 Buy-and-Build Compounders, Explained

Last updated: August 2026

Quick answer. The clearest real-world vertical SaaS roll-ups are Constellation Software (Toronto, TSX:CSU — more than 1,100 businesses, hold-forever, ~100 deals a year) and its spin-outs Topicus.com and Lumine Group; Roper Technologies (NASDAQ:ROP — a free-cash-flow compounder now ~76% software); Tyler Technologies (NYSE:TYL — one vertical, government, consolidated since 1998); and on the private side Banyan Software (120+ businesses acquired, sold zero) and Fullsteam (software plus embedded payments). The honest counter-example is EverCommerce, which rolled up 50-plus service-SaaS companies, went public in 2021, and has since pulled back from acquisition-led growth as its stock fell well below the IPO price. The single transferable lesson across all seven: the model works because vertical software is sticky and cash-generative — but the returns come from price discipline and light-touch ownership, not from the act of acquiring itself.

I'm Chris Chen. Before joining Peony, a data room company, I spent years in M&A at Moelis & Company across industrials, healthcare, and consumer deals, and buy-and-build was on the table in most of them. So when an AI answer tells you "add-ons are the dominant PE strategy" and you click through wanting real examples of vertical SaaS roll-ups, I know exactly the gap you hit: the lists are vague, they cite one company and stop, or they invent deal counts that fall apart the moment you check a filing.

This is the version I wish existed. Seven serial acquirers of vertical software, each with a company-stated or credibly sourced acquisition count and an as-of date, the operating model spelled out (hold-forever versus a private-equity exit; decentralized versus tightly integrated), and one transferable lesson per example — including a genuine cautionary case, because pretending every roll-up compounds forever is how these articles mislead. Every example-specific number below links to its source. None of these companies is a Peony customer; they are public and well-documented, which is exactly why they make good teaching examples.

Why is buy-and-build the dominant playbook in software right now?

Because the money and the math both point at it. Add-on acquisitions represented 72.9% of all US private-equity buyouts by deal count in full-year 2025, flat versus 73.1% in 2024 and in line with the five-year average of 72.8% — per PitchBook's 2025 Annual US PE Breakdown. Buy-and-build is not a niche; it is how most sponsor deals now get done. Feeding it is a wall of capital: global buyout dry powder stood at about $1.3 trillion as of mid-2025, and it is aging, which pressures firms to deploy — from Bain & Company's Global Private Equity Report 2026.

Software is where a lot of that pressure lands, and the deal supply is there to absorb it. SaaS M&A hit a record 2,698 transactions in 2025, up 28% from 2,107 in 2024 — the highest annual count on record — and momentum carried into 2026, with trailing-twelve-month volume through the second quarter reaching 2,784 deals, up 16% year-over-year, according to Software Equity Group's 2026 Annual SaaS Report and its 2Q26 report. Thousands of small, profitable vertical-software companies change hands every year — the raw material a roll-up needs.

The reason vertical SaaS in particular rewards this model comes down to the economics of the software itself. Good vertical-market software is mission-critical, sticky, and high-margin: the dental practice, the municipal court, the trucking dispatcher run their whole operation on it, so they rarely switch. Acquired revenue therefore compounds instead of leaking away, which is the whole point of a roll-up — you are buying annuity streams and stacking them. That is the frame. Now the companies that actually did it.

Here is the summary table, then the walk-through.

Why is Constellation Software the blueprint every roll-up cites?

Constellation Software is the reference implementation of the software roll-up: buy small vertical-market software companies, never sell them, and do it at enormous volume with disciplined prices. Mark Leonard, a former venture capitalist, founded it in Toronto in 1995 on a deliberately un-VC thesis — acquire niche software businesses and own them permanently rather than flip them. It trades on the Toronto Stock Exchange as CSU, and by its own operating-groups page it is now "more than 1,100 businesses" organized into nine decentralized operating groups: Harris, Volaris, Jonas, Topicus, Perseus, Vela, Lumine, Modaxo, and Andromeda.

The scale of the acquisition engine is the part imitators underestimate. Constellation's Q4 and full-year 2025 report shows roughly $1.5 billion of cash deployed on acquisitions in 2025, and the company's decentralized groups collectively close on the order of 100 deals a year — most of them small, at a low single-digit-million median size. Constellation reported FY2024 revenue of about US$10.1 billion. This is not one big bet; it is thousands of small, individually-underwritten annuities stacked over three decades.

What actually makes it work is the combination of three things, and the order matters. First, price discipline: every acquisition is underwritten to a hurdle rate, and Constellation walks away rather than overpay — the return comes from the entry price as much as the business. Second, decentralization: the operating groups have real authority to source and close their own deals, so the model scales past what any central corp-dev team could review. Third, permanent ownership: because nothing is ever sold, management teams stay, products keep shipping, and the acquirer can promise a founder a genuine home rather than a two-year integration.

Lesson: the Constellation model is repeatable in principle and brutally hard in practice — the deal volume is a symptom of the price discipline and decentralization, not a substitute for them. Imitators who copy the "buy lots of vertical software" headline without the hurdle rate and the hands-off ownership are copying the easy part.

How did Topicus and Lumine extend the Constellation playbook?

Topicus.com is Constellation's proof that the playbook travels — the same decentralized, hold-forever model, run on European vertical software, as a separately listed company. Constellation spun Topicus out in January 2021 from its Total Specific Solutions segment; it trades on the TSX Venture Exchange as TOI, with dual headquarters in Toronto and Deventer, the Netherlands. By its own about page, Topicus serves "more than 100,000 customers in 40 different vertical markets" across 26 European countries, with over 10,000 employees and consolidated revenues around EUR 1.55 billion. In 2025 it reported roughly EUR 390 million of acquisition consideration, plus a large separate stake purchase in Asseco Poland — showing the same acquisition intensity Constellation runs, adapted to a fragmented European market.

Constellation ran the same move again in a different niche. Lumine Group completed its spin-out in February 2023 and began trading that March as LMN on the TSX Venture Exchange, to consolidate communications and media software worldwide — it began life anchored by the acquisition of WideOrbit. Two spin-outs, two different verticals, one operating system.

The transferable insight here is structural, and it is the most sophisticated lesson in this piece. Constellation did not just acquire companies; it productized its own acquisition model and then spun the instances out as independent public compounders. Topicus and Lumine each get their own currency (a listed stock to issue and to motivate operators), their own geographic or sector focus, and their own runway — while inheriting the parent's disciplined playbook. Very few roll-ups reach the altitude where the acquisition process itself becomes the replicable asset.

Lesson: the endgame of a great roll-up is not a bigger company but a repeatable engine you can instantiate in new verticals and geographies. If the model only works with the founders personally underwriting every deal, it is a good business; if it works as a system others can run, it is a compounding machine.

What makes Roper Technologies a different kind of software compounder?

Roper Technologies runs buy-and-build as a free-cash-flow compounding machine, and its own history is the cleanest example of a serial acquirer transforming what it even is. Headquartered in Sarasota, Florida, and trading on the Nasdaq as ROP, Roper's stated model is to generate cash from a portfolio of asset-light, high-margin businesses and redeploy it into more of the same. Over roughly fifteen years it used that engine to remake its own revenue base: per its FY2024 10-K, software rose from about 10% to roughly 76% of revenue. In 2024 Roper reported about $7.04 billion of revenue and roughly $2.3 billion of free cash flow, a 32% margin.

The distinction from Constellation is one of altitude and emphasis. Constellation buys hundreds of tiny companies at a small median size; Roper buys fewer, larger vertical-software platforms — CentralReach, Subsplash, and others in recent years — and holds them in a lean portfolio structure. But the underlying logic is identical: acquire durable, cash-generative businesses that lead defensible niches, run them with a light hand, and let the cash they throw off fund the next acquisition. Roper's own commentary frames the goal as durable long-term cash-flow compounding and disciplined capital deployment, not headcount or facility "synergies."

That last point is the lesson most operators get backwards. Roper does not buy companies to strip costs out of them; it buys them for the cash they already generate and the growth they can sustain, then leaves them intact. The math of how add-on cash flows compound is the whole engine — cost synergy is a rounding error next to the annuity you preserve by not breaking the business.

Lesson: the best software acquirers optimize for cash flow they can redeploy, not for synergies they can extract. A roll-up that measures success in headcount cuts is fighting the model; one that measures it in reinvestable free cash flow is running it.

Why is Tyler Technologies the deepest single-vertical roll-up?

Tyler Technologies shows the concentrated version of the strategy: pick one vertical, own it completely, and build unassailable depth rather than breadth. Tyler was founded in 1966 and, since 1998, has focused exclusively on software for the public sector — courts, local government, public safety, schools, and payments. It trades on the New York Stock Exchange as TYL and reported roughly $2.3 billion of revenue in 2025, serving tens of thousands of government installations across all 50 US states.

Where Constellation goes a mile wide across every conceivable vertical, Tyler goes a mile deep in one. Its acquisitions all reinforce the same customer: New World Systems (public safety, 2015), Socrata (open data, 2018), and above all its $2.3 billion acquisition of NIC in 2021 — a digital-government and payments platform that was, by a wide margin, its largest deal ever and expanded it into transaction-based government payments. Recent tuck-ins like Edulink and CloudGavel keep filling in the same map. Tyler has made on the order of 30-plus acquisitions over its history — far fewer than Constellation, by design, because each one deepens a single vertical instead of opening a new one.

The advantage of depth is that it compounds into things breadth cannot buy: reference customers in every state, domain expertise that raises switching costs, and cross-sell across a government's court, finance, and public-safety systems. The risk is the mirror image — concentration. Tyler's fortunes are tied to public-sector IT budgets and procurement cycles, so a single end-market's slowdown hits the whole portfolio at once, where a Constellation is diversified across hundreds of unrelated niches.

Lesson: depth in one vertical and breadth across many are both valid roll-up strategies, but they are different bets. Depth buys pricing power and switching costs at the cost of concentration risk; breadth buys diversification at the cost of ever becoming irreplaceable to any one customer. Pick deliberately — the failure mode is drifting between them.

What does the EverCommerce example warn against?

EverCommerce is the roll-up in this piece that has struggled, and it is here precisely because a list of only winners would be dishonest. Founded in 2016 and based in Denver, EverCommerce assembled a portfolio of service-oriented SaaS across three verticals — home and field services, health services, and wellness — serving, by its own site, more than 745,000 small businesses. It was built acquisitively and fast: its board's own investor materials credit its founding CEO with leading the company through "more than 50 acquisitions" and its 2021 IPO, and its S-1-era disclosures counted 49 companies acquired since inception through the listing. On paper, it looked like an American service-SaaS Constellation.

Then the public market re-rated the story. EverCommerce went public in July 2021 at $17.00 a share; by late August 2026 the stock traded around $9.55, well below the offer price. Just as tellingly, the company's own posture changed: it divested its Marketing Technology segment in late 2025 and shifted its messaging away from acquisition-led top-line growth toward same-customer expansion, margins, and return on capital. A machine built to acquire started, in public, to prune and to prioritize integration quality.

I want to be careful and fair about what this does and does not prove. EverCommerce is a real, sizable, ongoing business, not a bankruptcy, and none of the above says its underlying software is bad. What it demonstrates is narrower and more useful: acquiring quickly is not the same as compounding value, and public markets will punish a roll-up whose acquired growth outruns its integration, margins, and returns. The verticals were fine; the market's verdict was on whether the accumulated whole was worth more than the sum of the checks written to build it.

Lesson: the danger in a roll-up is not a single bad deal — it is confusing acquisition velocity with value creation. If the pieces are not more valuable together than the price paid to assemble them, a fast-growing acquirer becomes a slow-motion disappointment, and the public market prices that in ruthlessly.

How does Banyan Software run buy-and-hold at the small end?

Banyan Software takes Constellation's permanent-ownership philosophy to the smaller, private end of the market and makes "we never sell" the entire pitch to founders. Founded in 2016 and based in Atlanta, and led by founder David Berkal, Banyan's own homepage states it has acquired "120+ software businesses and sold zero," describing itself as a permanent home for enterprise and vertical software companies in niche markets. It is private and backed by long-term, permanent-style capital rather than a fixed-life fund.

Because Banyan is not on a fund clock, the promise it makes is different from a private-equity buyer's, and that difference is the product. A traditional sponsor tells a founder: we will grow this and sell it in three to seven years. Banyan tells a founder: we will keep your business, your team, and your name indefinitely, and give you permanent capital to keep building. For an owner who cares what happens to their people and customers after the check clears — which is most bootstrapped vertical-SaaS founders — that is a materially different offer, and it is how a smaller acquirer wins deals against better-capitalized bidders.

The trade-off is real and worth stating plainly. Permanent-hold acquirers typically buy control and rarely offer the second bite at equity that a PE platform can — you sell once, cleanly, and the upside afterward is theirs. So the honest way to read Banyan against a PE roll-up is not "better," it is "different incentives": less disruption and a real home, in exchange for giving up the levered upside a sponsor exit might have delivered. If you are weighing that trade from the founder's side, it is the core of how to sell a SaaS company.

Lesson: at the small end of vertical SaaS, the acquirer's holding period is a feature you are selling to founders, not just an internal choice. Permanent capital lets a smaller buyer win against bigger checkbooks — because for the right seller, "we will never sell you" is worth more than a marginally higher price.

Why does Fullsteam bolt payments onto the software roll-up?

Fullsteam is the roll-up that treats the software as a way to own the payments, and it represents one of the most important recent evolutions of the model. Founded in 2018 with headquarters in Auburn, Alabama and Atlanta, and backed by Aquiline Capital Partners, Fullsteam acquires vertical-market software businesses and then embeds payment processing into them. Its May 2023 investment announcement put its portfolio at more than 70 acquisitions, and its own site describes ongoing acquisition activity since. The targets are typically small vertical-SaaS businesses in the roughly $1M-$10M ARR range, held for the long term.

The strategic logic is what makes Fullsteam worth studying even though the exact count moves. Vertical software sits directly on top of a merchant's transactions — the salon-booking tool, the gym-management system, the field-service scheduler all touch the moment money changes hands. By owning the software and then routing the payments through it, Fullsteam adds a second, usage-based revenue stream (payment-processing economics) on top of the software subscription, so each acquired company can be worth more under Fullsteam's ownership than it was standalone. That is a genuine, non-financial-engineering reason the combined whole exceeds the sum of the parts — the rarest and most valuable property a roll-up can have.

It also raises the integration bar, which is the honest caveat. Attaching payments is not passive ownership; it requires actually migrating a merchant base onto new processing, which is real operational work and real execution risk. This is a more hands-on model than Constellation's deliberate light touch — a reminder that "software roll-up" spans a wide spectrum from pure holding company to active operational platform.

Lesson: the strongest roll-up theses have a source of combination value beyond cost savings — payments attach is a clean example, because it adds a new revenue stream to every acquired company. But every point of added value raises the integration bar, so the more your thesis depends on transforming the target, the more execution risk you are underwriting.

What do these seven roll-ups have in common?

Line them up and the same patterns recur, regardless of whether the acquirer is a $10-billion-revenue public compounder or a private permanent-capital shop buying $3-million businesses.

1. They buy sticky, cash-generative vertical software. Every winner here targets mission-critical software with low churn and high margins — the properties that let acquired revenue compound instead of leak. This is upstream of everything else. The reason vertical SaaS rewards buy-and-build is the economics of the software itself, not any financing trick.

2. Price discipline is the actual engine. Constellation's hurdle rate, Roper's cash-return focus, Banyan's small-end buying — the returns come from paying disciplined prices, deal after deal, far more than from any single acquisition. The failure mode, visible in EverCommerce's re-rating, is letting acquisition velocity outrun the value each deal actually adds.

3. Light-touch ownership beats heavy integration — usually. The purest compounders (Constellation, Topicus, Roper, Banyan) leave management and products in place and preserve the annuity they bought. The exceptions (Fullsteam's payments attach) integrate deliberately for a specific, additive reason — and take on more execution risk to do it. Nobody in this list wins by stripping targets for cost synergies.

4. The holding period defines the whole strategy. Hold-forever acquirers optimize for durable cash flow over decades and can promise founders a permanent home; PE-built roll-ups like EverCommerce optimize for an exit and are priced on that clock. Neither is superior in the abstract, but confusing the two is where operators and founders both get hurt.

5. Volume is a symptom, not the strategy. Constellation's ~100 deals a year and Banyan's 120-plus businesses are consequences of a disciplined, decentralized, repeatable process — not the cause of the returns. Imitators who chase the deal count without the underwriting discipline reliably underperform. This is the single most common misread of the entire category.

The through-line: buy-and-build in vertical SaaS works because good vertical software is a compounding annuity, and it fails when acquirers overpay or over-integrate. The macro backdrop — 72.9% add-on share, record SaaS deal volume, $1.3 trillion of dry powder — guarantees more of these roll-ups are coming. Whether any given one compounds or disappoints will come down to the five patterns above.

What does it mean if you are building or selling a vertical SaaS roll-up?

If you are building one, the examples are a spec sheet. Decide your holding-period model first, because it drives everything downstream — a Constellation-style hold-forever engine and an EverCommerce-style build-to-IPO play price, integrate, and report completely differently. Underwrite every add-on to a real hurdle rate and be willing to walk; the math of how add-on acquisitions compound only works if you do not give the returns away at the entry price. And decide honestly how hands-on your thesis is: if your combination value is just "we own more software" (Constellation), keep the touch light; if it is transformational like a payments attach (Fullsteam), staff for the integration you are signing up for.

Operationally, the constraint at roll-up cadence is not any single transaction — it is running many small diligences at once without the cost of your tooling scaling with them, and without re-onboarding the same reviewers into every new room. That is a documents-and-access problem before it is a strategy problem, and it is the one place I can speak from direct experience. I run Peony, and 6,800+ customers use it to keep this kind of material organized and permissioned. The mechanics that matter at serial-acquirer cadence: one subscription is unlimited rooms, so a program running fifteen concurrent add-on rooms costs the same as one running a single deal; per-viewer watermarking so a leaked page from a founder's carve-out traces back to one recipient; and page-level analytics on every tier so you can see which schedules a target keeps reopening. The Data Room plan is $52 per admin per month on annual billing ($75 monthly) with unlimited storage, Business is $30 ($44 monthly), and there is a free tier at $0 — and the full operational stack for assembling a platform through add-ons lives in the roll-up data room guide.

If you are selling into one — the bootstrapped founder who just realized a serial acquirer is your likeliest buyer — study who is actually buying in your vertical and what they optimize for. A permanent-capital buyer like Banyan is offering a home and one clean sale of control; a PE-built platform may offer a second bite at equity but more change. Set expectations on price using the real band, not a headline: median private SaaS M&A ran about 4.0x EV/revenue in 2Q26 inside a roughly 4x-6x range, smaller companies sell for less, and clearing the Rule of 40 earns a documented premium. The full seller-side playbook is in how to sell a SaaS company, and if you want the landmark buyout deals beyond software, the leveraged buyout examples piece covers the largest ones on record.

This post is general information, not investment advice — the specifics of any acquisition, valuation, or roll-up strategy are matters for your own advisors.

Frequently asked questions

What are the best real-world examples of vertical SaaS roll-ups?

The most instructive verified examples span four models. Constellation Software (Toronto, TSX:CSU) is the blueprint — its own site reports more than 1,100 businesses across nine operating groups, bought to hold forever, closing roughly 100 acquisitions a year. Topicus.com and Lumine Group are its publicly traded spin-outs running the same playbook in European and communications-media software. Roper Technologies (NASDAQ:ROP) compounds free cash flow into vertical software, which is now about 76% of its revenue. Tyler Technologies (NYSE:TYL) shows the single-vertical version — it has consolidated government software since 1998, capped by its $2.3 billion NIC acquisition. Banyan Software (120+ businesses acquired, sold zero) and Fullsteam (software plus embedded payments) show the private, permanent-capital end. EverCommerce is the cautionary one: it rolled up 50-plus service-SaaS companies, IPO'd in 2021, and its stock has fallen well below the offer price as it pulled back from acquisition-led growth.

What is Constellation Software's acquisition strategy, in plain terms?

Constellation Software buys small vertical-market software companies and never sells them. Mark Leonard founded it in Toronto in 1995 on a permanent-ownership thesis: acquire niche software businesses with sticky customers, hold them indefinitely, let them run autonomously inside decentralized operating groups (Harris, Volaris, Jonas, Topicus, Perseus, Vela, Lumine, Modaxo, Andromeda), and recycle their cash into more of the same. Its own operating-groups page reports more than 1,100 businesses; its Q4 2025 report shows about $1.5 billion of cash deployed on acquisitions in 2025 alone, spread across roughly 100 deals a year at a small median size. The discipline is a hurdle rate on every deal and a refusal to overpay — not a single big bet. That combination of high deal volume, decentralized authority, and hold-forever ownership is why it is the company almost every software roll-up now cites.

Do software roll-ups actually work, or do most of them fail?

Both are true, and the split is not random. Vertical SaaS is unusually well suited to buy-and-build because good vertical software is sticky, high-margin, and mission-critical — customers rarely churn, so acquired revenue compounds instead of leaking. Constellation Software, Roper, Topicus, and Tyler are multi-decade demonstrations that it works when the acquirer pays disciplined prices and lets proven businesses keep running. Where roll-ups struggle is on the two things that have nothing to do with software: overpaying at the top of a cycle, and over-integrating — ripping out the teams and products that made the target worth buying. EverCommerce is the honest caution here: a real, sizable roll-up whose acquisition-led growth story lost favor with public markets, pushing it toward selectivity and a divestiture. The model works; the execution is where imitators fail.

What is the difference between a hold-forever acquirer and a PE roll-up that exits?

It changes the incentives end to end. A hold-forever acquirer like Constellation, Topicus, Roper, or Banyan buys to own permanently, so it optimizes for durable cash flow and low churn over decades, tends to leave management and products in place, and can promise a founder a genuine permanent home. A private-equity roll-up assembles a platform and its add-ons on a fund clock — typically a three-to-seven-year hold — then sells the whole thing or takes it public, so it optimizes for a clean equity story and multiple expansion at exit, and integration is usually tighter because a buyer is coming. Neither is better in the abstract. If you are a founder, the hold-forever model means less disruption but usually a full sale of control; the PE model can mean a second bite at equity but more change. If you are the acquirer, the exit clock is the single biggest driver of how you price, integrate, and report.

How much do software serial acquirers pay for a SaaS company, and what multiple should I expect?

For the small vertical-SaaS deals these acquirers specialize in, the honest anchor is the broad private-market band, not a headline number. Software Equity Group's series puts median private SaaS M&A at about 4.0x EV to trailing revenue in the second quarter of 2026, inside a roughly 4x-6x band; Aventis Advisors, whose universe skews smaller, reports a lower 3.1x median for the first quarter of 2026. Smaller companies generally sell for less — Aventis's size bands run from roughly 3.3x for the smallest deals up to about 6.2x for the largest. Serial acquirers like Constellation are famously price-disciplined and buy at small median deal sizes, so a sub-$10M-ARR vertical SaaS business should not expect a growth-stage headline multiple. Quality shifts it: businesses clearing the Rule of 40 trade at a documented premium. There is no single 'serial-acquirer multiple' — there is a band, and your churn, margin, and growth decide where in it you land.

Who are the biggest software serial acquirers besides Constellation?

The most documented, in different lanes: Roper Technologies (NASDAQ:ROP) compounds free cash flow into vertical software and technology, now about 76% of its revenue, at roughly $2.3 billion of annual free cash flow. Topicus.com (TSXV:TOI) runs the Constellation playbook across more than 40 European vertical markets. Lumine Group (TSXV:LMN) does the same in communications and media software. Tyler Technologies (NYSE:TYL) is the deepest single-vertical example, consolidating US government software. On the private side, Banyan Software (Atlanta, founded 2016) has acquired 120-plus businesses as a permanent home and sold zero, Fullsteam (Auburn and Atlanta, founded 2018) pairs vertical software with embedded payments, and Valsoft (Montreal) has assembled 150-plus vertical-software companies. These are the names an operator studying buy-and-build in software should actually read.

I run a serial-acquirer add-on program. What does the diligence and data-room stack look like at that cadence?

At roll-up cadence the constraint is not any single deal — it is running many small diligences at once without the per-deal cost of your tooling scaling with them. When you close dozens of sub-$10M-ARR targets a year, you cannot afford a per-project data-room bill on every one, and you need the same reviewers (finance, legal, the operating-group lead) moving across rooms without re-onboarding. That shaped how I think about the stack. I run Peony, a data room company used by 6,800+ customers, on flat per-admin pricing: one subscription is unlimited rooms, so a program running fifteen concurrent add-on rooms pays the same as one running one. Data Room is $52 per admin per month on annual billing ($75 monthly) with unlimited storage, per-viewer watermarking so a leaked page from a founder's carve-out traces to one recipient, and page-level analytics so you see which schedules a target keeps reopening; Business is $30 ($44 monthly); and there is a free tier at $0. It is not the deal thesis — but when your edge is deal volume, tooling that meters per deal quietly taxes the exact thing you are good at.

Sources

Every example-specific figure traces to the company's own site or filing, a securities filing, or a top-tier report. Macro statistics are drawn from the fact pack cited inline (PitchBook, Software Equity Group, Bain, Aventis).

• Constellation Software: founded 1995 by Mark Leonard, Toronto, TSX:CSU; "more than 1,100 businesses," nine operating groups; ~$1.5B acquisitions in 2025; FY2024 revenue ~US$10.1B. — Constellation operating groups; Q4/FY2025 results release; Wikipedia, "Constellation Software", retrieved Aug 2026.
• Topicus.com: spun out from Constellation Jan 2021, TSXV:TOI, dual HQ Toronto / Deventer NL; "more than 100,000 customers in 40 different vertical markets," 26 countries, 10,000+ employees, ~EUR 1.55B revenue. — Topicus About Us; Wikipedia, "Constellation Software", retrieved Aug 2026.
• Lumine Group: spun out from Constellation March 2023, TSXV:LMN; consolidates communications and media software; anchored by WideOrbit acquisition. — Lumine Group / Constellation spin-out release, retrieved Aug 2026.
• Roper Technologies: Sarasota FL, NASDAQ:ROP; software ~76% of revenue (up from ~10% over ~15 years); FY2024 revenue ~$7.04B, free cash flow ~$2.3B (32% margin). — Roper FY2024 10-K (SEC); Roper 2024 results release; Morningstar, "Roper Is a Leading Vertical Software Acquisition Machine", retrieved Aug 2026.
• Tyler Technologies: founded 1966, public-sector-only since 1998, Plano TX, NYSE:TYL; ~$2.3B revenue 2025; acquired NIC for $2.3B in 2021 (largest deal); 30+ acquisitions to date (Tracxn lists 34 as of Aug 2026). — Wikipedia, "Tyler Technologies"; StateScoop, "Tyler Technologies to buy NIC for $2.3 billion"; Tracxn acquisition list, retrieved Aug 2026.
• EverCommerce: founded 2016, Denver, NASDAQ:EVCM; 745,000+ customers; "more than 50 acquisitions" (board/IR), 49 companies through the 2021 IPO per S-1-era disclosure; IPO July 2021 at $17.00; ~$9.55 close on Aug 24, 2026; divested Marketing Technology segment late 2025. — EverCommerce site; EverCommerce board of directors / IR; IPOScoop, EverCommerce IPO; EverCommerce Q4/FY2025 results, retrieved Aug 2026.
• Banyan Software: founded 2016, Atlanta, founder/CEO David Berkal; "120+ software businesses and sold zero"; permanent-capital, hold-forever, private. — Banyan Software homepage; Banyan Software About, retrieved Aug 2026.
• Fullsteam: founded 2018, Auburn AL / Atlanta GA, Aquiline-backed; "more than 70 acquisitions" (May 2023); vertical software plus embedded payments; targets ~$1M-$10M ARR, held long-term. — PR Newswire, "Fullsteam Secures Major Investment from Aquiline and ADIA," May 2023; Fullsteam About, retrieved Aug 2026.
• Valsoft: Montreal-based; 150-plus vertical-software companies across 20+ industries; long-term / permanent-capital ownership. — Valsoft About Us, retrieved Aug 2026.
• Macro statistics: add-on share 72.9% of US PE buyouts by count, FY2025 (PitchBook 2025 Annual US PE Breakdown); SaaS M&A 2,698 deals in 2025, up 28% (SEG 2026 Annual SaaS Report); buyout dry powder ~$1.3T mid-2025 (Bain Global Private Equity Report 2026); median private SaaS M&A ~4.0x EV/revenue 2Q26 (SEG quarterly); size bands and 3.1x Q1 2026 median (Aventis Advisors), retrieved Aug 2026.

Related resources

• Add-On Acquisition Strategy — the math of how add-on cash flows compound in a buy-and-build platform.
• Roll-Up Data Room — the operational stack for assembling a platform through many add-on acquisitions.
• SaaS Valuation Multiples — what SaaS businesses actually sell for, by size, growth, and quality.
• How to Sell a SaaS Company — the seller-side playbook for founders whose likely buyer is a serial acquirer.
• Leveraged Buyout Examples — the largest and most famous buyouts on record, with honest verdicts.